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Abstract 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
This paper provides an empirical estimation of the research productivity effects associated with periodic Research 
Assessment Exercises. From a sample of academic economists in the UK, data are taken directly from each 
individual’s vita, permitting us to construct a detailed longitudinal data set with specific productivity measures at 
various points along each individual’s experience-productivity profile. Our general approach was to measure 
individual productivity levels during a period immediately before each RAE event and for a period immediately 
after the event. Our results suggest that these periodic assessment exercises have increased the cumulative research 
productivity of individuals over time. These productivity enhancing effects have not been uniformly distributed 
across RAE ranked departments or across individuals within similar ranked programmes, however. Individuals at 
higher-ranked programmes tended to respond by increasing their research output in higher-quality journals, while 
individuals at other programmes tended to increase their publications in other outlets. Finally, the productivity 
response occurred primarily among individuals whose pre-RAE output was below the requisite number of 
publications required to be included in the RAE.  
_______________________________________________________________________ 
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Under financial pressure, the University Grants Committee (UGC) conducted the first Research 
Assessment Exercise (RAE) in 1986. The purpose of the RAE was to evaluate academic units of 
assessment (UOA) so that research funds could be concentrated into more research active departments in 
each discipline across universities (Cave, Hanney and Kogan 1991). To evaluate a department’s research 
performance, each RAE had to explicitly (or implicitly) establish a set of performance indicators. 
Universities are expected to adopt strategic policies in response to the performance indicators and 
individuals, in turn, are expected to adjust their behaviour in response to their university policies. 
This study measures the effects of the various RAEs on research productivity by examining the 
publications listed on the vitae of a sample of UK academic economists.  Limiting the study to a single 
discipline makes it easier to measure research output in terms of quality and quantity.  The vitae also 
contain information on control variables that are required to identify the true effect of the RAEs on 
research.  By examining changes in research outputs over the four RAE cycles, we can isolate the effects 
of the RAEs. The system-wide average productivity of economists can only rise if the existing staff 
members increase their research efforts or the system attracts relatively high productivity researchers who 
are working elsewhere (Hare and Wyatt, 1992). Questionnaire surveys and personal interviews indicate 
that research performance has improved as a consequence of the RAEs, but this is not based on hard data 
(McNay 1997; HEFCE 1997; and Adams et al. 2000). 
 
1.  The UK Research Assessment Exercises 
This study examines the effects of the 1986, 1989, 1992 and 1996 RAEs on the quantity and 
quality of research output among a sample of academic economists. These exercises share a number of 
characteristics. They all used informed peer review panels to rank each UOA within a particular 
discipline. While each RAE used multiple research performance indicators, they all focused on 
publications as a major indicator in the final ratings. However, the panels have been criticised for not 
explicitly indicating the weights they attach to the performance indicators and to the weights they accord   3
 
to different types of publications in making their evaluations (Johnes 1990; Cave, Hanney, and Kagan, 
1991; and Adams, et al., 2000).  While the Economics Assessment Panel has indicated that publication 
quality is more important than quantity in the evaluation process, it denies that it has attempted to rank 
journals in any formal sense. 
The absence of an explicit weighting scheme makes it more difficult for universities to devise 
optimum response strategies and it increases the subjective powers of the panels.  Johnes (1990) has 
shown that the ranking of forty UK Economics Departments is highly sensitive to the choice of weights 
assigned to staff and types of publications.   
Based on the panel evaluations the UOA or departments are placed on a grading scale that is used 
to allocate available research funds in the post-RAE period.  The rating scales have been expanded over 
time from a four point scale in 1986 to a seven point scale in 1996. Grade levels that were funded varied 
from exercise to exercise. In 1989 and 1992 grade 1 received no funds and in 1996, grades 1 and 2 
received no funds. 
It is important to note that while RAE research funds are generated by individual UOAs, such 
funds are provided to universities in the form of a block grant.  Vice-Chancellors are free to reallocate 
those resources in any way they choose.  Virtually all of the RAEs have been criticized for using different 
assessment standards in different subjects, which may have led to a misallocation of research funds 
(Cave, Hanney, and Kagan, 1991; and Adams, et al., 2000).  Further, it is not clear that the same 
standards have been used within the same discipline over time (Taylor and Izadi, 1998).   
Under the RAEs, departments receive credit for the publications of the staff on their payrolls at 
the time of the exercise.  This encourages departments to recruit outstanding researchers from other 
institutions and has led to the development of the so-called transfer market (McNay 1997). Below we 
consider the research performance indicators used in each RAE.  
The 1986 RAE Publication Standards.  The 1986 RAE applied only to existing universities.  
Each UOA was specifically requested to provide details on the numbers of research staff and research   4
 
students, and titles of not more than five recent books or articles, or other comparable examples of 
research achievement, which the university would regard as typical of the best of its research in the 
subject area since 1980 (Cave, Hanney, and Kagan, 1991). The request for information on only five 
departmental publications was criticised for being inadequate and biased in favour of large departments. 
Subsequent empirical studies showed that the 1986 RAE subject ratings were positively correlated with 
departmental size, but less well correlated with departmental publication rates (Cave, Hanney, and Kagan 
1991).  We regard the 1986 RAE as somewhat of a trial run.  The research performance indicators are 
relatively weak and directed at departments, not individuals.  For these reasons, we predict that the 1986 
RAE did not have a significant effect on research performance. 
The 1989 RAE Publication Standards.  The 1989 exercise continued to include only universities.  
It requested information on the total number of publications (books, chapters in books, papers in journals 
and other identifiable output) in relation to the number of full-time academic staff over the period 1984-
1988 in each unit of assessment, bibliographic details of up to two publications for each full-time member 
of the academic staff, the number and value of research grants and contracts, and the number of research 
studentships.  By focusing on the per staff number of publications and the two best publications per staff 
member the exercise reduced the advantage larger departments had in the previous exercise and clearly 
indicated that both quantity and quality of research were important considerations. While the Economics 
Panel like others did not indicate the relative weights it attached to different types of publications, a 
subsequent study by Johnes and Johnes (1993) reported that papers and letters in academic journals, 
authored books and contributions to the Diamond (1989) core journals had a significant influence on the 
1989 RAE rankings of economics departments. These results were interpreted to mean that contributions 
to academic journals, especially the core journals, were the key to achieving a high rating in economics.   
The 1992 RAE Publication Standards.  This Exercise was the first one to cover all higher 
education institutions including PCFC institutions, Scottish Central Institutions, the Open University, 
Cranfield Institute of Technology, the Royal College of Art and higher education colleges in Wales and   5
 
Northern Ireland.  For the first time UOAs did not have to include their entire academic staffs in the 
exercise.  Their rankings were based solely on the output of those staff designated as research active. As a 
consequence, university decision-makers pursuing research funds faced two new strategic decisions. They 
had to decide which staff to include in the RAE and to which discipline panel each research group should 
be submitted (Talib, 1999). Deleting weak staff could improve their rating, but the number of staff 
submitted was a major multiple in the funding formula.  
The publication standards remained unchanged in this exercise.  UOAs were asked to report the 
total number of publications relative to the research active staff and to provide detailed information on 
two publications for each staff member submitted for the 1989 to 1992 period.  In a subsequent study, 
Taylor (1995) reported that the only publication variable that had a significant effect on the 1992 RAE 
ratings-out of those collected was articles in refereed journals.  This study confirms the importance of 
academic journal publications in the RAE ratings. 
The 1996 RAE Publication Standards.  Once again all higher education institutions were 
allowed to participate in the 1996 RAE and the number of submissions increased by 6 percent.  The 
publication standards were changed significantly.  The designated research active staff was invited to 
detail four publications for the period 1 January 1992 to 31 March 1996.  The requirement to indicate the 
total number of publications for each UOA was dropped to emphasis that the exercise was concerned with 
quality not quantity. 
 
2.  Reported Effects of the RAE 
The perceived effects of each RAE are based primarily on questionnaire responses and interviews 
conducted at different points of time when some RAEs had been completed and others were in progress.  
The surveys, however, did not control for other factors, so we cannot be certain whether the perceived 
changes are real (HEFCE, 1997). With these caveats in mind, consider the perceived effects of the RAEs.   6
 
Institutional Responses to the RAE.  Survey research indicates that the RAEs have had five 
major impacts on UK universities relevant to this study (McNay, 1997; and HEFCE, 1997).  First, 
universities have made a number of structural changes to improve their research performance.  They have 
given research a higher priority, developed internal processes for evaluation, selectively allocated 
resources for research, placed senior managers in charge of monitoring and managing the work and 
planning for the next exercise.  Second, universities have reallocated RAE generated research funds and 
other monies in such a way as to achieve the highest possible average UOA rating in the next exercise. 
Third, beginning with the 1992 RAE, universities have become more selective in designating their 
research active staff.”  Fourth, many universities have chosen to submit their economics staff to Business 
and Management Studies or other RAE panels rather than to Economic and Econometric panels. 
Finally, universities adopted a number of personnel policies designed to increase the research 
performance of their existing faculty and to recruit outstanding researchers.  These include extra pay, 
teaching load reductions, and early promotions for outstanding researchers.  Unproductive senior faculty 
were encouraged to retire early and other unproductive faculty were designated as non-active research 
staff and given increased teaching loads. A new transfer market was created (McNay, 1997). New posts 
were allocated to enhance the next RAE ratings and recruitment policies became more selective in terms 
of research records (Harley and Lee, 1995; and McNay, 1997). Survey responses indicate that department 
heads believe that these institutional responses have led to improved research performance (McNay, 
1997; HEFCE, 1997).     
Individuals Responses to the RAE.  After each  RAE establishes new research performance 
standards, universities adopt policies and reward (and penalty) structures designed to motivate their 
faculty. Individuals are expected to optimise in response to the incentive system adopted by their 
university. Not all individual faculty members are subject to the same pressures and we therefore, expect 
them to respond in different ways. First, individuals in more highly rated departments are under more 
pressure to publish in high-quality journals, whereas individuals in lower-rated departments may feel   7
 
strong pressure to simply publish more regardless of its location. Second, individuals currently meeting or 
exceeding new RAE research performance standards at their grade UOA face less pressure to increase 
their research efforts.  Those performing slightly below these standards will be under much more pressure 
to improve their research performance. Third, human capital theory suggests that the costs of investing in 
human capital increases and the returns decrease with age. Therefore, the research response to the RAE is 
likely to vary by age.  
The survey evidence uniformly reports that academics spend more time on research and that their 
research output has improved, both quantitatively and qualitatively, since the introduction of the RAE 
(McNay, 1997; HEFCE, 1997; Adams et al. 2000). In the following analysis we test whether these 
perceptions can be supported by the data.  
 
3. The Data Set and Empirical Design 
  
The data for this study are taken from individual vitae of full-time faculty members employed at 
UK universities. Approximately 1000 individuals at 60 economics departments were contacted by email 
and asked to provide a copy of their vita. We obtained additional vitae by searching departmental web 
sites. This process resulted in a total of 158 individual vitae containing complete information for each 
individual as of 1999. The final data set is particularly appropriate for our study since it provides detailed 
information on individual characteristics such as academic experience, seniority and sex, as well as a 
variety of individual productivity measures. More importantly, it allows us to construct a detailed 
longitudinal data set with specific productivity measures at various phases of each individual’s life 
cycle—exact points on the life cycle being determined by the date of each RAE event. Our sample 
excludes individuals who currently occupy administrative positions above the level of department 
chairperson.    8
 
  Table 1 provides information about the sample composition and how it compares to the sample 
composition in other studies. Note that our sample contains a higher proportion of professors and a lower 
proportion of lecturers than the other surveys. We also have a higher proportion of faculty members from 
RAE rank 4 and a lower proportion from RAE rank 3. While we have no individuals from RAE rank 1 
departments, faculty members at these institutions typically are not research scholars. Overall, however, 
the composition or our sample does not deviate substantially from the other samples.    
  Since our object is to determine whether individual research output has been responsive to 
Research Activity Exercises, individual productivity is measured separately for the period immediately 
prior to and immediately after each Exercise. Thus, for each RAE we have a before-after snapshot of an 
individual’s research productivity. To account for the lumpiness in publications, measures of research 
productivity are defined over an interval. The length of each interval is determined by the number of years 
between RAE events. Because the number of years between RAE events is not uniform, our measure of 
research output is defined as the average number of publications per year during each interval.  
  We define the pre-RAE publication periods so that they correspond as closely as possible to the 
actual publication intervals requested by each RAE. The initial period for the construction of the 
longitudinal data set is the 1986 Research Activity Exercise. The base line publication record for each 
individual is measured by the average number of publications per year for a five-year period just prior to 
the 1986 Exercise. To the extent that there was a productivity response created by the Exercise, it should 
be imbedded in the individual’s research output in the period immediately following the Exercise. We 
therefore, define post-RAE productivity as the average number of publications per year in the interval 
between the 1986 and the 1989 Exercises.  
  For the 1989 Exercise the baseline productivity record is defined for the five-year period just 
prior to the Exercise. Post-RAE productivity is defined as the average annual publication record between 
1989 and 1992. The pre- and post-RAE productivity measures are defined similarly for the 1992 and the 
1996 Exercises. As we move forward in time, we advance along each individual’s experience-  9
 
productivity profile. At the same time, additional observations are added at the lower end of the 
experience distribution. No individuals, however, exit the sample. Thus, we are able to follow the same 
individuals through different phases of their life cycle and relate changes in their research output to each 
RAE event, holding experience constant. 
 
4. The Empirical Results   
  The human capital model motivates the specification of the regressions that follow. It is assumed 
that productivity growth results from optimal investments in research training that diminish gradually 
over the life-cycle. We begin first by determining whether there were any general productivity responses 
to each of the Research Activity Exercises. We then make explicit life-cycle adjustments to each 
individual’s observed productivity growth and relate deviations from the expected life-cycle productivity 
growth to each RAE. Further, we hypothesize that the productivity incentives are not uniform across 
productivity distributions.  
  General Productivity Response. Consider first an empirical model that captures the effects of 
each RAE in the following manner: 
 
  Pit =  Xβ + δRAE + ε   t  =   0 , 1       ( 1 )  
 
For each individual i, Pi0 denotes the average number of publications per year during the pre-RAE period 
and Pi1 denotes the average number of publications per year in the post-RAE period. The dummy variable 
RAE equals unity if t = 1 and it equals zero otherwise. The vector X contains the human capital variables 
experience and its squared term, as well as a control variable for the RAE rank of the department to which 
the individual was affiliated (proxies unmeasured quality of a heterogeneous faculty or departmental 
spillover effects). Holding constant the productivity effects of experience, δ will measure the independent 
effect of an RAE on the change in an individual’s productivity between period t = 0 and t = 1. For   10
 
                                                
example, if δ > 0, then the data suggest that the RAE caused individuals to increase their research output 
over what would have been expected from increased experience (i.e., movement along the experience-
productivity profile).  
  Table 2 reports the general productivity effects of each Research Assessment Exercise for 
individuals at RAE level 4, 5 and 5
+ programmes. The sample is restricted to these programmes because 
the 1986 and 1989 RAEs did not cover the new universities in which most lower rated departments are 
found. Also, we stratify the sample by RAE rankings (Department Quality) in order to explore whether 
productivity responses differ between higher ranked and lower ranked programmes. The dependent 
variable for the OLS regressions in Table 2 is defined for research output published in “quality” journals.
1 
Note that the estimates depict an increasing concave experience-productivity profile for academic 
economists in the UK.
2 This is consistent with virtually all of the previous studies that have examined 
life-cycle productivity profiles.
3 Also, we find that individuals at higher quality programmes (Department 
Quality) tend to produce more quality publications that individuals at lower ranked programmes. 
  Turning to our primary focus, in the cross-sectional regressions we can find no evidence of a 
significant aggregate productivity shock from any of the individual RAEs. While the coefficients on the 
RAE dummy variables are positive, none attain significance at conventional levels.  
The last two columns of Table 2 report the pooled regressions. In both specifications, we are 
attempting to test whether the effects of the four Exercises have had a cumulative effect on research 
productivity. We structure the data in two ways. First, we estimate the model for a sample of individuals 
who were present during the pre-1986 exercise and follow this cohort through the four exercises (that is, 
we do not include any individuals who entered the profession subsequent to 1980). We refer to this as a 
 
1. Our list of quality journals is provided in the Appendix. This list includes the top-tier general interest journals as 
well as second-tier general interest journals and the top field journals. For a discussion of how the list of quality 
journals was determined see Moore, Newman and Turnbull (1998 and 2001).  
2. With the exception of the 1986 regression, all the joint F tests of the linear and quadratic experience terms are 
significant.  
3. See for example, Oster and Hamermesh (1998).   11
 
                                                
cohort-constant model. In the last column we estimate the same model, but during each interval new 
entrants are permitted to enter the sample (new entrants model). The baseline productivity period is 
defined for the years 1980 through 1989. This is accomplished by omitting the 1986 RAE dummy 
variable. Each RAE dummy variable is defined for a particular segment of each individual’s experience-
productivity profile. Specifically, each RAE dummy is set equal to unity for the interval immediately 
following that exercise and ending with the year of the next exercise. The null hypothesis is that the RAE 
did not shift the individual’s experience-productivity profile upward; that is, there was no significant 
increase in the individual’s research output that cannot be explained by the movement along the profile.  
As is true for the cross-sectional models, the pooled estimates depict an increasing concave 
experience-productivity profile for academic economists. In both models the results suggest that the 1992 
and 1996 exercises caused a significant upward shift in the experience-productivity profiles for 
researchers at higher-quality programmes relative to the 1980-1989 period. Thus, while we were unable to 
detect these effects in the individual cross-sectional models, the pooled data suggest that there may have 
been a cumulative productivity shock over an individual’s career; that is, cumulative research output in 
quality journals is higher than it would otherwise have been.
4 For example, the coefficient estimate in the 
cohort-constant sample implies that the effects of the 1992 RAE caused per capita publications in quality 
journals to increase by approximately one publication during the four year period following that exercise 
(holding constant the productivity-augmenting effects of increased experience). The cumulative effect of 
the 1996 exercise raised the average number of publications in the subsequent four-year period by an 
additional ½ publication. The corresponding publication changes in the model allowing new cohort entry 
are: a 0.7 increase in per capita publications following the 1992 exercise and  an additional 0.8 increase in 
per capita publications following the 1996 exercise. 
 
4. For the sample of economists at RAE 4, 5 and 5+ programmes, regressions were also estimated with the 
dependent variable (Pit) defined for publications in “all other outlets.” The model could not “explain” the variation in 
the publication records outside the list of quality journals. Further, none of the coefficients on the RAE dummy 
variables was statistically significant.  The results can be obtained from the authors upon request.    12
 
                                                
The fact that the 1992 and 1996 dummy variable coefficients are larger and more significant in 
the pooled, cohort-constant model than in the pooled equation with new entrants indicates that the rise in 
quality publications was mainly caused by existing faculty increasing their research efforts rather than by 
an increase from the inflow of new highly productive faculty into the profession.  
Our results suggest that the 1992 RAE was the first to have a positive and significant productivity 
shock for individuals producing in quality journals. There are a number of possible explanations. The 
1986 RAE set relatively weak publication standards at the department level. Thus, pressure on individual 
faculty to adjust their research behaviour may have been minimal. The 1989 RAE established a two-
publication standard for individual staff, but the quality dimension was not specified and information on 
the total number of publications in relation to the number of full-time academic staff was requested. 
Subsequent analysis however, reveals that the quality of publications was a major factor in the 1989 RAE 
ratings.  
  By 1992, most economists and university administrators were cognisant of the importance of 
publication quality in the RAE rankings. Furthermore, the 1992 RAE was the first to allow universities to 
designate and submit research active staff. By this time they had developed internal monitoring systems to 
identify and reward active researchers and to penalize inactive researchers. It is not surprising; therefore, 
that individual staff members responded to the new incentives and that the 1992 RAE had a significant 
impact on quality research output. The relatively large and highly significant positive coefficient on the 
1996 RAE dummy variable indicates the continued increase in quality publications. 
In Table 3, we report pooled general productivity regressions for faculty at RAE ranked 2 and 3 
programmes.5 Results are presented for both “quality publications” and publications in “all other outlets.” 
In this sample, the RAE dummy variables measure the productivity effects relative to the entire period 
prior to the 1992 exercise. The first two columns present the results for quality publications for the 
cohort-constant and the new entrants models. Both sets of results suggest that within the set of quality 
 
5. Individuals in new Universities which tend to be lower ranked did not participate in the 1986 and 1989 exercises.   13
 
                                                
journals there was no cumulative productivity shock among individuals at lower-ranked programmes.
6 
However, the estimates presented in the last two columns strongly suggest that the 1992 and the 1996 
Exercises had a positive and significant effect on their research productivity in “other outlets.” The 1992 
RAE coefficient estimate in the cohort-constant sample suggests that on average, individuals increased 
their total number of publications in the four-year period following that exercise by about 3 (over and 
above what would have been expected with additional experience). While the implied productivity 
response may seem surprisingly high, it is important to note that the number of “other” publication outlets 
available to economists is also surprisingly large. In one recent world ranking of economics departments, 
the author used publication counts in 600 journal outlets.
7 Thus, the number of potential outlets, with a 
substantial variation in quality standards, provides ample opportunities for individuals to accumulate 
publication counts. 
Note also, that the cohort-constant RAE coefficient is higher than the coefficient in the new 
entrants model, again suggesting that the productivity effects resulted from existing faculty increasing 
their research efforts rather that an increase from the inflow of new researchers.  
  Specific Productivity Responses.  The general productivity response estimates contain both life-
cycle effects and the potential effects of each RAE. Recall that we are advancing along the experience-
productivity profile of individuals who were on the steeply sloped portion of that profile in the 1980s, but 
have moved (on average) to the flatter portion of their profile in the mid-1990s. Our strategy in this 
section is to eliminate the life-cycle productivity effects imbedded in the post-RAE productivity 
measures. This is accomplished by measuring an individual’s relative productivity growth between the 
pre- and post-RAE event as a comparative change among individuals in the same experience cohort. Our 
point of reference is the productivity growth that occurred within a particular experience cohort. The 
objective is to distinguish between growth-induced change that occurs along an individual’s life cycle 
 
 
6. A publication in one of the quality journals is a relatively rare occurrence for individuals in this sample. 
7. See Coupe (2000). Coupe reports that Econlit indexes about 650 journals.   14
 
                                                
productivity profile and the growth-induced change that may have resulted from the incentives created by 
the RAE. We start with the following measure of relative productivity change 
 
  Pij
1 – Pij
0  (Pj 
1 / Pj
0)             (2) 
 
where Pij
1 represents the average number of publications per year during a specified period post-RAE for 
the i
th  individual in journal quality level j and Pij
0  denotes the same for the pre-RAE period.
8 The 
corresponding pre- and post-RAE publication levels for the i
th individual’s experience cohort are Pj
1 and 
Pj
0, respectively—both are measured by the within-sample means. We define four experience cohorts: 
less than 5 years of academic experience, 5 to 10 years, 11 to 15 years and greater than 15 years of 
experience. Thus, for an individual who started the pre-RAE productivity period with 5 years of academic 
experience, we compare that individual’s productivity to the average productivity of all individuals in the 
sample with 5 to 10 years of experience. We then follow that same group of individuals into the post-
RAE period, using their mean number of publications per year as our measure of Pj
1. This process is 
repeated for each subsequent Research Assessment Exercise and consequently, ensures that individuals 
are repeatedly compared to other individuals within the same experience cohort.   
(Pj 
1 / Pj
0) is a hypothetical productivity growth rate, which imputes the cohort-specific growth 
rate to each individual. It is intended to remove that component of an individual’s productivity growth 
that can be attributed to pure life cycle effects. A positive residual represents a relative gain in 
productivity; that is, a gain relative to the average for others within the same experience cohort. 
Converting the above differential into percentage terms yields 
 
  SDi  =  (Pij
1 / Pij
0)  -  (Pj
1 / Pj
0)       ( 3 )  
 
 
8. We use multiple years because of the lumpiness of publications and because the number of years between RAE 
events is not the same.   15
 
SD is intended to capture the effects of potential productivity incentives that may have been created by 
each RAE. To the extent that the RAE has resulted in a positive productivity response among some 
researchers, there will be a positive divergence between the individual’s actual productivity growth and 
the predicted life cycle productivity growth. (Pj
1/Pj
0) represents the predicted productivity growth that an 
individual would have experienced had no factors peculiar to the RAE intervened to affect the 
individual’s research output.   
  A positive value of SD means that the individual’s publication record grew faster than the average 
among individuals within the same experience cohort. If the value of SD is negative, the individual’s 
publication record grew less rapidly than the average among individuals within the same experience 
cohort.  
We expect, however, that the effects of the RAE on individual productivity will not be uniform 
across individuals. To the extent that the RAE generates a productivity shock, it is not likely to affect 
individuals with research records that placed them at the upper portion of the productivity distribution. 
Individuals who are most likely to have responded to the RAEs are those who were “below the bar;” that 
is, those who did not produce the critical number of publications within the period prior to the RAE. 
Thus, we define the following variable: 
 
                   1  if  Nij
0  <  Cj 
  BELOWi   =                                 (4) 
                                                    0  Otherwise  
 
 
where  Cj  denotes the number of publications that were required for each RAE and Nij is the number of 
level j publications produced by an individual in the pre-RAE period. Level j takes two values: We divide 
publications into quality journals (see appendix) and all other outlets. Obviously, for researchers whose 
productivity significantly exceeds the critical value defined for the previous RAE, it is unlikely that in the 
post-RAE period they will deviate from their life cycle productivity profile for reasons related to the   16
 
                                                
RAE. But, for those “on the bubble” it is possible that the RAE may induce a productivity increase in the 
subsequent period. As an empirical proposition, we assume that individuals who had the exact number of 
requisite publications or slightly over are on the bubble. We therefore, define the following variable: 
 
                                          1  if    Nij
0  = Cj  or   Nij
0  = Cj  +  1 
  SLIGHTLY ABOVEi     =           ( 5 )  
                                                        0  Otherwise  
 
 
In the 1989 and 1992 RAE events, Cj = 2, while Cj  = 4 for the 1996 RAE. The regression model 
becomes: 
  
SDi = Xβ + γ (BELOWi ) + δ (SLIGHTLY ABOVEi ) + ε                   (6) 
 
 The vector X contains the following control variables: the individual’s actual experience, the 
quality of the department the individual is affiliated with (Department Quality) and gender. Actual 
Experience is measured by the value of the individual’s average experience during each productivity 
interval (mid-point). It merely provides an additional control for the effects of experience on productivity 
growth within cohorts. Gender is a control for possible productivity differentials that may exist between 
males and female. The gender variable (Male) is equal to unity if male and zero for females.    
We start by estimating the productivity response across all RAE ranked programmes. This 
permits us to define (Pj
1/Pj
0) for four experience cohorts. Table 4 reports the first set of OLS regressions 
for specific productivity responses within quality journals.
9 The results strongly suggest that there was a 
significant productivity response for individuals whose level of research output in the pre-RAE period fell 
below the requisite number of publications to be included in that particular Exercise. That is, on average, 
 
9. Individuals ain new Universities were not included in the 1989 Exercise and therefore, were deleted in the 1989 
regression. They were, however, included in subsequent Exercises.   17
 
                                                
individuals whose baseline productivity was below the critical number of publications in the pre-RAE 
period (BELOW=1), responded by increasing their research output in quality journals beyond that which 
would have been anticipated for individuals with the same level of experience (cohort-specific 
productivity). The positive productivity effect appears to have resulted in the increased level of 
publications within quality journals.
10 Again, since the coefficient estimates appear to be fairly large, it 
may be useful to examine the actual change in the pre- and post-RAE output for those researchers who 
were below the bar. For example, the number of publications for individuals below the bar for the 1989 
exercise increased from approximately 1.2 journal articles in the pre-RAE period to about 1.9 in the post-
RAE period. The corresponding change for individuals above the bar was 4.65 articles in the pre-RAE 
period to 3.45 articles in the post-RAE period (a reduction of about 26 percent). Thus, while the 
percentage changes are large, the change in the number of publications is not. This distinction applies to 
all remaining estimates as well.  
The last column of Table 5 reports the estimates from a pooled sample across the 1989, 1992 and 
1996 exercises. Qualitatively, the results are the same—overall the three research assessment exercises 
have caused individuals below the bar to increase their research output above the level that would have 
been expected from the productivity-augmenting effects of accumulated experience. 
There was apparently no productivity response among individuals who were “on the bubble.” 
While the coefficient on SLIGHTLY ABOVE is consistently positive in all models, it never attains 
statistical significance. The growth in research output of individuals “on the bubble” does not deviate 
significantly from the expected research growth of other individuals with the same level of academic 
experience. 
 
 
10. In this specification Cj  defined for publications in quality journals only. Regressions were also estimated for SD 
defined as publications in “all other outlets.” For these regressions, Cj was defined as the number of publications in 
other outlets.  The coefficients on BELOW  (defined for “all other publications”) never attained statistical 
significance for SD regressions.   18
 
                                                
In the general response regressions we found evidence that productivity responses varied across 
RAE ranked programmes. While individuals at higher-ranked programmes responded by increasing their 
output in quality journals, individuals at lower-ranked programmes increased their output in “other 
outlets.”  
We again divide the sample into two sub-samples: RAE rank 4, 5 and 5+ departments and RAE 
rank 2 and 3 departments.
11 Results for the higher-ranked programmes are reported in Table 5. With the 
exception of the 1996 exercise, individuals whose productivity was below the critical number of 
publications in the RAE responded by increasing their productivity in quality journals relative to others 
with the same level of experience. The pooled regression reported in the last column indicates a 
significant cumulative productivity response in quality journals over the three RAE events.   
We also estimated a set of specific productivity regressions for individuals at RAE rank 2 and 3 
departments. We could find no evidence that the BELOW variable had a significant effect on individual 
research output in quality journals in the post-RAE periods. Also, our pooled regressions for this group of 
economists did not reveal a cumulative effect on research output within the quality journals.
12  
In contrast, the results reported in Table 6 indicate that individuals at RAE rank 2 and 3 
departments, whose publication level fell below the critical value in the pre-RAE period, responded by 
increasing their research output in “other outlets” (i.e., research outlets outside the 60 quality journals 
listed in the appendix).
13 Apparently, they have responded to the incentives the RAE created by increasing 
their publications in lower-quality outlets above the level anticipated for individuals in the same 
experience cohort. The results from the pooled regression suggest that overall there may have been 
 
11. Stratifying the data substantially reduced the number of observations within each of the four experience cells. 
Thus, we had to restrict the number of experience cohorts to two categories: individuals with less than 15 years of 
experience and individuals with more than 14 years of experience.  
12. Regression results for this sub-sample can be obtained from the authors upon request.  
13. An identical set of regressions was estimated for individuals at higher-ranked programmes. The results indicate 
that individuals at these programmes did not increase their research output in “other outlets.” These results can be 
obtained from the authors upon request.   19
 
positive productivity responses in other outlets to the cumulative effects of the three Exercises, even 
though we cannot detect these effects separately for the 1992 exercise. 
Consistent with the results reported in Table 4, we find that the SLIGHTLY ABOVE variable 
never attains statistical significance in either sub-sample. Thus, overall, the specific productivity response 
regressions reported in this section are consistent with the aggregate productivity regressions discussed 
earlier. Further, they confirm our hypothesis that the productivity incentives created by the RAE are not 
uniform across the productivity distributions.  
 
5. Summary and Conclusions   
  This study measured the effects of the various Research Activity Exercises on the research output 
of academic economists. Data for this study are taken directly off individual vitae, permitting us to 
construct a detailed longitudinal data set with specific productivity measures at various points along each 
individual’s experience-productivity profile. Thus, we were able to determine whether changes in 
individual research output were systematically related to the Research Activity Exercises, holding 
experience constant.  
  Four general conclusions can be drawn from our pre/post RAE general productivity analysis. 
First, the 1992 RAE was the first to significantly affect the research productivity of UK economists. 
Economists currently residing in RAE rank 4, 5 and 5+ programmes significantly increased their 
publications in quality journals during the 1992 to 1996 period compared to the 1980 to 1989 period. 
Second, the 1992 RAE also led to a significant increase in publications in “other outlets” for economists 
at RAE 2 and 3 programmes, but it had no effect on their production in quality journals. Third, the 1996 
RAE strongly reinforced these patterns. Fourth, the increase in research productivity following the 1992 
and 1996 RAEs was due to the existing faculty increasing their research efforts rather than the result of 
new more productive individuals who entered the profession during our sample period. These results are   20
 
not as robust as we would like for each period. The effects reported are cumulative and cover an extended 
period of time, so there may be potential for omitted variable bias in our estimates.  
Our next strategy involved removing life-cycle effects from each individual’s productivity growth 
and then focusing on the subset of individuals most likely to be affected by each RAE. The results from 
this experiment strongly suggest that there has been a significant productivity response among individuals 
whose level of research output in the pre-RAE period fell below the requisite number of publications in 
each RAE. That is, on average, individuals whose baseline productivity was below the critical number of 
publications, responded by increasing their level of research output above the level that would have been 
expected for individuals with the same level of experience. The RAEs had no influence individually or 
collectively on the research productivity of economists whose pre-RAE productivity was equal to or 
above the publication standards of each RAE. These economists apparently felt no pressure to increase 
their research efforts. 
  Specific productivity responses varied across RAE quality departments. It appears that 
individuals at lower ranked programmes responded by increasing their research output in “other 
publication outlets,” while individuals at higher ranked programmes responded by increasing their 
publications in “quality journals.” Overall, our results suggest that individuals at the lower end of the 
productivity distribution have responded to the Research Assessment Exercises by increasing their 
observed research output. For those faculty members “on the bubble,” we can find no evidence of a 
productivity response related to periodic research assessments. However, it is possible that these 
individuals may have extended their research productivity beyond what would have occurred because of 
life-cycle effects. That is, we cannot address the counter factual question of what would have happened to 
the productivity of these individuals in the absence of the RAE. 
  Finally, it should be noted that our results are based on a non-random sample. Individuals 
voluntarily contributed approximately half of our vitae and we collected the remainder from departmental 
web sites. It is possible, therefore, that our sample is subject to selectivity bias if successful researchers   21
 
were more likely to respond to our request. Our independent sampling from vitae on departmental web 
sites and our use of cohort-constant models was at least partially motivated by a desire to reduce the 
possible effects of this bias. Also, we cannot include in our sample individuals who may have withdrawn 
from the academic labor market earlier than planned because of the implementation of the RAE.       22
 
 
     Table 1. Composition of Sample as of 1999 and Comparison with Other Studies 
 
 
 
 
Present 
Study 
 
Blackaby & 
Frank 
(2000) 
 
Booth & 
Burton 
(1999) 
 
Machin & 
Oswald 
(2000) 
 
HEFCE 
(1996) 
 
Percent Within Rank: 
       
 
    Lecturers  
 
31.5 
 
37.8 
 
44.8 
 
44.1 
 
-- 
 
   Senior Lecturers/Readers   
 
32.7 
 
20.1 
 
21.4 
 
25.2 
 
-- 
 
   Professors 
 
34.6 
 
25.3 
 
18.8 
 
20.1 
 
-- 
 
   Researchers 
 
1.2 
 
4.7 
 
12.0 
 
10.6 
 
-- 
 
Distribution of Faculty by 
Department RAE Score: 
    
 
 
  
 
     5
+ 
 
8.9 
 
12.9 
 
11.4 
 
-- 
 
13.4 
 
     5 
 
21.5 
 
23.7 
 
20.8 
 
-- 
 
27.8 
 
     4 
 
40.5 
 
28.1 
 
20.1 
 
-- 
 
32.2 
 
     3
a 
 
11.4 
 
25.6 
 
34.3 
 
-- 
 
21.2 
 
     2 
 
17.7 
 
8.5 
 
12.4 
 
-- 
 
4.2 
 
     1 
 
0 
 
1.3 
 
1.0 
 
-- 
 
1.2 
 
Percent Male: 
 
90.6 
 
-- 
 
-- 
 
-- 
 
-- 
 
Sample Size: 
 
158 
 
516 
 
81 
 
44 
 
 
 
 
        
 
a This category combines “3 upper” and “3 lower.” 
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     Table 2. General Productivity Effects of the Research Activity Exercises at 
     RAE Level 4, 5 and 5
+ Programmes: Quality Publications 
 
 
Variable 
 
1986 RAE 
 
1989 RAE 
 
1992 RAE 
 
1996 RAE 
Pooled 
Cohort 
Constant 
Pooled 
With New 
Entrants 
 
Experience 
 
0.018 
(0.82) 
 
0.043
a 
(1.24) 
 
0.038
a 
(1.46) 
 
0.023
a 
(0.89) 
 
0.0132
a 
(0.43) 
 
0.043* 
(2.78) 
 
Experience
2 
 
-0.001 
(0.74) 
 
-0.002
a 
(1.64) 
 
-0.001
a 
(1.68) 
 
-0.001
a 
(1.43) 
 
-0.001
a 
(1.39) 
 
-0.002* 
(3.25) 
 
Department 
Quality 
 
0.424* 
(3.91) 
 
0.414* 
(5.04) 
 
0.312* 
(4.63) 
 
0.393* 
(5.69) 
 
0.375* 
(5.73) 
 
0.377* 
(8.34) 
 
RAE86 
 
0.063 
(0.40) 
 
-- 
 
-- 
 
-- 
 
-- 
 
 
RAE89 
 
-- 
 
0.058 
(0.51) 
 
-- 
 
-- 
 
0.068 
(0.53) 
 
-0.013 
(0.13) 
 
RAE92 
 
-- 
 
-- 
 
0.149 
(1.48) 
 
-- 
 
0.263** 
(1.85) 
 
0.179* 
(1.91) 
 
RAE96 
 
-- 
 
-- 
 
-- 
 
0.080 
(0.76) 
 
0.395* 
(2.37) 
 
0.199* 
(2.18) 
 
Intercept 
 
-1.383* 
(2.20) 
 
-1.573* 
(3.25) 
 
-1.163* 
(2.99) 
 
-1.221* 
(3.26) 
 
-1.143* 
(2.85) 
 
-1.473* 
(5.93) 
 
d.f. 
 
77 
 
97 
 
121 
 
149 
 
198 
 
325 
 
F value 
 
4.08* 
 
6.93* 
 
6.31* 
 
9.96* 
 
6.48* 
 
13.62* 
 
Adjusted R
2 
 
.13 
 
.19 
 
.15 
 
.19 
 
.14 
 
.19 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
        a Joint F-test is significant at .10 or higher 
     * Significant at .05   
     ** Significant at .10 
     (| t | - value) 
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                      Table 3. General Productivity Effects of the Research Activity Exercises  
 At RAE Level 2 and 3 Programmes: Pooled Regressions 
 
 
Variable 
Quality  
Publications
Cohort 
Constant 
Quality 
Publications 
With New 
Entrants 
Other 
Publications 
Cohort 
Constant 
Other 
Publications 
With New 
Entrants 
 
Experience 
 
0.001 
(0.01) 
 
0.003 
(0.26) 
 
0.079 
(0.64) 
 
0.091 
(1.38) 
 
Experience
2 
 
-0.000 
(0.08) 
 
-0.001 
(0.52) 
 
0.003 
(0.74) 
 
-0.003 
(1.14) 
 
Department 
Quality 
 
0.227* 
(5.48) 
 
0.233* 
(5.82 
 
1.490* 
(4.91) 
 
1.027* 
(4.30) 
 
RAE92 
 
0.009 
(0.16) 
 
0.014 
(0.28) 
 
0.742** 
(1.74) 
 
0.569** 
(1.92) 
 
RAE96 
 
-0.020 
(0.25) 
 
0.074 
(1.45) 
 
1.170* 
(2.02) 
 
0.778* 
(2.58) 
 
Intercept 
 
-0.429* 
(2.66) 
 
-0.469* 
(3.79) 
 
-2.982* 
(2.52) 
 
-2.064* 
(2.79) 
 
d.f. 
 
99 
 
155 
 
99 
 
155 
 
F value 
 
6.15* 
 
7.75* 
 
6.53* 
 
5.73* 
 
Adjusted R
2 
 
.20 
 
.17 
 
.21 
 
.13 
 
 
    
 
                   * Significant at .05   
                             ** Significant at .10 
                              (| t | - value)   25
 
     Table 4.  Specific Productivity Response Regressions in Quality Publications for 
                     Research Activity Exercises 1989, 1992 and 1996    
 
 
Variable 
 
1989 RAE 
 
1992 RAE 
 
1996 RAE 
Pooled 
1989-1996 
 
BELOW 
 
1.441* 
(3.48) 
 
0.775* 
(2.38) 
 
0.597** 
(1.62) 
 
0.851* 
(4.04) 
 
SLIGHTLY 
ABOVE 
 
0.500 
(1.13) 
 
0.280 
(0.81) 
 
-0.220 
(0.50) 
 
0.142 
(0.61) 
 
Actual 
Experience 
 
-0.012 
(0.68) 
 
0.013 
(1.21) 
 
-0.008 
(0.72) 
 
-0.002 
(0.26) 
 
Department 
Quality 
 
0.390* 
(2.51) 
 
0.216* 
(2.82) 
 
0.137** 
(1.64) 
 
0.200* 
(3.76) 
 
Male 
 
0.668 
(1.03) 
 
0.413 
(0.98) 
 
0.174 
(0.34) 
 
0.365 
(1.24) 
 
RAE92 
 
-- 
 
-- 
 
-- 
 
-0.120 
(0.79) 
 
RAE96 
 
-- 
 
-- 
 
-- 
 
-0.010 
(0.68) 
 
Intercept 
 
-2.944* 
(2.69) 
 
-1.903* 
(2.97) 
 
-0.827 
(1.09) 
 
-1.487* 
(3.20) 
 
d.f. 
 
55 
 
89 
 
109 
 
263 
 
F value 
 
3.38* 
 
2.91* 
 
1.74 
 
4.77* 
 
Adjusted R
2 
 
.17 
 
.09 
 
.04 
 
.09 
 
        * Significant at .05   
        ** Significant at .10 
      (| t | - value)     26
 
                     Table 5.  Specific Productivity Response Regressions for Faculty at RAE 4, 5 and 5
+  
                     Departments:  Quality Publications 
  
 
Variable 
 
1989 RAE 
 
1992 RAE 
 
1996 RAE 
Pooled 
1989-1996 
 
BELOW 
 
1.491* 
(3.45) 
 
0.865* 
(2.05) 
 
0.570 
(1.43) 
 
0.899* 
(3.80) 
 
SLIGHTLY 
ABOVE 
 
0.570 
(1.23) 
 
0.240 
(0.55) 
 
-0.250 
(0.52) 
 
0.133 
(0.51) 
 
Actual 
Experience 
 
-0.026 
(1.27) 
 
-0.000 
(0.02) 
 
-0.005 
(0.39) 
 
-0.008 
(0.90) 
 
Department 
Quality 
 
0.371** 
(1.75) 
 
0.123 
(0.69) 
 
0.115 
(0.66) 
 
0.165** 
(1.56) 
 
Male 
 
0.715 
(1.04) 
 
0.596 
(1.02) 
 
0.215 
(0.34) 
 
0.481 
(1.34) 
 
RAE92 
 
-- 
 
-- 
 
-- 
 
-0.136 
(0.73) 
 
RAE96 
 
-- 
 
-- 
 
-- 
 
-0.205 
(1.15) 
 
Intercept 
 
-2.720* 
(2.08) 
 
-1.499 
(1.33) 
 
-0.793 
(0.70) 
 
-1.329* 
(1.97) 
 
d.f. 
 
45 
 
57 
 
71 
 
183 
 
F value 
 
3.37* 
 
1.57 
 
1.25 
 
3.82* 
 
Adjusted R
2 
 
.19 
 
.05 
 
.02 
 
.09 
 
      * Significant at .05   
      (| t | - value)   27
 
                                   Table 6. Specific Productivity Response Regressions  for Faculty 
                                    at RAE Departments 2 and 3 :  Other Publications 
  
 
Variable 
 
1992 RAE 
 
1996 RAE 
Pooled 
1992-1996 
 
BELOW 
 
0.630 
(1.17) 
 
1.164* 
(2.41) 
 
.853* 
(2.50) 
 
SLIGHTLY 
ABOVE 
 
-0.437 
(0.75) 
 
-0.526 
(1.18) 
 
-0.474 
(1.47) 
 
Actual 
Experience 
 
-0.038 
(1.11) 
 
-0.005 
(0.19) 
 
-0.012 
(0.60) 
 
Department 
Quality 
 
0.015 
(0.03) 
 
0.074 
(0.16) 
 
0.027 
(0.08) 
 
Male 
 
0.802 
(0.56) 
 
0.789 
(0.60 
 
0.749 
(0.82) 
 
RAE92 
 
-- 
 
-- 
 
0.148 
(0.46) 
 
Intercept 
 
-0.144 
(0.06) 
 
-1.015 
(0.55) 
 
-0.600 
(0.46) 
 
d.f. 
 
26 
 
32 
 
63 
 
F value 
 
0.77 
 
1.45 
 
1.60 
 
Adjusted R
2 
 
-.04 
 
.06 
 
.05 
 
                     * Significant at .05   
                     (| t | - value) 
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Appendix 
(Unranked) 
1.  American Economic Review  29.  Journal of Environmental Economics & 
Management 
2. Econometrica  30.  Journal  of  Finance 
3.  Economic Journal  31.  Journal of Financial Economics 
4. Economica  32.  Journal of Financial and Quantitative 
5.  International Economic Review    Analysis 
6.  Journal of Economic Theory  33.  Journal of Health Economics 
  Journal of Political Economy  34.  Journal of Human Resources 
8.  Quarterly Journal of Economics  35.  Journal of Industrial Economics 
9.  Review of Economic Studies  36.  Journal of Institutional and Theoretical 
10.  Review of Economics and    Economics 
  Statistics  37.  Journal of International Money and Finance 
11.  American Economics Associate  39.  Journal of International Economics 
  Papers and Proceedings    40.  Journal of Labor Economics 
12.  American Journal of Agricultural  41.  Journal of Law and Economics 
  Economics  42.  Journal of Legal studies 
13.  Brookings Papers on Economic  43.  Journal of Money Credit and Banking 
 Activity  44.  Journal  of  Macroeconomic 
14.  Canadian Journal of Economics  45.  Journal of Mathematical Economics 
15. Econometric  Theory  46. Journal of Monetary Economics 
16.  Economic History Review  47.  Journal of Public Economics 
17.  Economic Development and  48.  Journal of Regional Science 
  Cultural Change  49.  Journal of the Royal Statistical Society 
18.  Economic Inquiry  50.  Journal of the American Statistical 
19.  European Economic Review    Association 
20.  History of Political Economy  51.   Journal of Urban Economics 
21.  Industrial and Labor Relations  52.  Kyklos 
  Review  53.  National Tax Journal 
22.  Journal of Business  54.  Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics 
23.  Journal of Business and Economic  55.  Oxford Economic Papers 
 Statistics  56.  Public  Choice 
23.  Journal of Comparative   57.  Rand Journal of Economics 
  Economics  58.  Scandinavian Journal of Economics 
24.  Journal of Econometrics  59.  Scottish Journal of Political Economy 
25.  Journal of Economics Dynamics  60.  Southern Economic Journal 
. and  Control 
26.  Journal of Economic History 
27.  Journal of Economic Literature 
28.  Journal of Economic Behavior 
 and  Organization 
   29
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